SIGIR White Paper: Applying Hard Lessons

On Monday, 2 November, the Center for Complex Operations hosted a review of “Applying Hard Lessons,” the White Paper for Governmental Reform for Complex Operations drafted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). Special Inspector General Stuart M. Bowen, and Deputy Special Inspector General Ginger Cruz presented the principle rationale, recommendations and options identified in the White Paper, responded to queries from reviewers, and took note of the rich and insightful comments and discussion. As Special Investigator General Bowen emphasized at the outset of the meeting, “We are in the listening mode.”

This invitational event brought together 50 representatives of the defense, diplomatic, and development communities (the so-called 3Ds), as well as scholars and staffers from a variety of Congressional member and committee staffs, most of whom have been deeply involved in issued related to complex operations for many years.

SIGIR was established in 2004 by the U.S. Congress to conduct independent audits and investigations involving Iraq reconstruction, and to provide oversight of and objective leadership, coordination and recommendations on policies to promote economic efficiency and effectiveness in such operations. Drawing on hundreds of audits and investigations, SIGIR has published four reports on lessons learned, culminating in the February 2009 publication of “Hard Lessons; The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.”

The White Paper, “Applying Hard Lessons” builds from the previous four reports in this series. It offers suggestions for institutional reform to improve future U.S. response in complex operations based on the Iraq experience. While acknowledging that Iraq is an atypical case, and cannot be assumed as a template for the future, SIGIR argues the magnitude and intensity of U.S. operations in Iraq brought out inefficiencies and weaknesses in the U.S. response architecture that must be remedied if we hope to avoid making the same mistakes in the future.

Among the numerous issues raised during the review session several were particularly resonant. The need to identify goals, objectives and tasks must drive the institutional reform agenda. Is the goal of complex operations state building? Development? Stabilization? The optimal institutional configuration will differ significantly depending on the mission. Are the errors and failures of the Iraq experience, failures of institutional organization, or failures of leadership? Some participants questioned whether any institutional reorganization can overcome the critical role played by strong personalities in times of national security under threat. Discussants representing diverse “sectors” noted that the sense of urgency to correct the institutional mis-configurations that led to mistakes in Iraq has dissipated, and that the public and Congressional appetite for major foreign policy initiatives is very limited at this time.

SIGIR intends to consolidate both verbal and written comments and release the final version of “Applying Hard Lessons” in December.